Using vouchers to privatize an economy: the Czech and Slovak case by Svejnar, Jan & Singer, Miroslav
Economics of Transition, Volume 2 (I) ,  43-69, I994 
Using vouchers to privatize an economy: 
the Czech and Slovak case 
Jan Svejnar and Miroslav Singer 
CERGE-EI 
Charles University 
Politickjkh vtzilu 7 
P.O. Box 882 
111 21 Prague 1 
Czech Republic 
Tel: (422) 26 89 01 
1. Introduction 
The 1992 Czechoslovak privatization of state property has been widely heralded as one 
of the most impressive accomplishments in the economic transformation of the formerly 
communist economies. Before separating into two countries on January 1, 1993, 
Czechoslovakia undertook rapid large-scale privatization of state enterprises. A key 
element of the process was voucher privatization - the almost free distribution of 
vouchers to citizens who in turn used the vouchers to bid for shares in state enterprises. 
The design and implementation of the Czechoslovak voucher scheme has sparked a lively 
debate among academics and policy-makers in many countries. A small percentage of 
Russian enterprises has already been privatized through a different voucher scheme and 
other systems may be introduced in other transforming economies as well. 
While voucher privatization has an obvious popular appeal, many transitional 
economies have so far avoided it because of the perceived uncertainty about the process 
and its outcome. The iterative scheme used in Czechoslovakia is a relatively cumbersome 
procedure which has never been tried on a large scale before. The non-existence of 
supporting institutions and the inexperience of the participating citizens and officials also 
make it hard to assess its feasibility. The results of the 1992 Czechoslovak experiment 
are the first ones to reveal the behaviour of individual citizens, the investment 
privatization funds (IPFs) and the government authorities in the process of voucher 
privatization. As such, they are of significant academic as well as of policy interest.' 
In this paper we use data on the 1,491 enterprises which participated in the first wave 
of Czechoslovak voucher privatization to undertake an empirical analysis of (a) the 
demand of individual voucher holders and the IPFs for enterprise shares in the five 
rounds of bidding and @) the price-setting behaviour of the authorities in these rounds. 
Since the data set contains all the firm-specific as well as more aggregate variables that 
were publicly available to the bidding individuals and IPFs, we can assess the importance 
of the various indicators for the bidding behaviour. Similarly, using the data that were 
available to the authorities, we are able to trace their complex price-setting behaviour and 
show that it can be very closely approximated by a relatively simple functional form. 
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The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we identify the main elements of the 
Czechoslovak privatization programme, with an emphasis on the voucher scheme. In 
Section 3 we describe the data set and in Section 4 we present the econometric model. 
In Section 5 we discuss the results, while in Section 6 we draw the conclusions. 
2. The Czechoslovak privatization programme 
As in many other Central and East European countries, the privatization of state property 
in Czechoslovakia was divided into two parts, covering small and large units, 
respectively. The privatization of small and medium sized units commenced in late 1990 
and has proceeded very successfully since then. It resulted in the privatization of tens of 
thousands of small establishments and a significant revenue inflow for the government.' 
2.1 Privatization of large firms 
In 1991 the Czechoslovak government earmarked approximately six thousand large 
enterprises for privatization. About 4,400 of these were in the Czech Republic and 1,600 
in Slovakia. The privatization process was divided into two waves, with each wave 
consisting of several rounds of bidding in the case of firms that entered voucher 
privatization. As can be seen from Table 1, the first wave, which took place .in 1992, 
involved over three thousand enterprises, thus covering about one-half of all firms slated 
for privatization. The shares of firms that entered voucher privatization were distributed 
in five rounds of bidding. In view of the partition of Czechoslovakia into two 
independent republics on January 1, 1993, the second wave was launched as originally 
scheduled in late 1993 in the Czech Republic but not in Slovakia. 
Within the first wave, which is the focus of this paper, enterprises were privatized on 
the basis of privatization projects which were selected from a number of competing 
proposals by the Czech and Slovak Ministries of Privatization and by the Federal 
Ministry of Finance. The projects could be submitted by any domestic or foreign 
individual or group and they could propose any one or a combination of permissible 
privatization methods, including direct sale to an individual or a private domestic or 
foreign firm, sealed bids, public auction, and distribution of shares to citizens at large 
through the system of vouchers. In the first wave, the number of submitted privatization 
projects per firm averaged 3.8; for some fms the number of submitted projects was in 
excess of twenty. 
Of the total number of 3,100 firms that entered the first wave, 1,491 were privatized 
either entirely or in part through the voucher method? The book value of shares 
allocated for the voucher privatization scheme in the first wave was 300 billion crowns 
(about $11 billion)! The voucher scheme consisted of the following procedure: each 
adult Czechoslovak citizen who was a permanent resident of Czechoslovakia was entitled 
to purchase a voucher book with 1,OOO investment "points" for 1,000 crowns (slightly less 
than one-third of the average monthly wage). 8.57 million adults ( ie . ,  most of the eligible 
individuals) purchased the voucher books, thus making the average accounting value of 
assets per voucher book 35,000 crowns. The voucher book holders then used the points 
to bid for those shares of the 1,491 companies that had been allocated for the voucher 
distribution. 
Prior to the start of the first wave, the voucher book holders could allocate part or all 
of their points to one or several of the 434 privately formed IPFs or they could keep the 
points in order Lo bid for enterprise shares directly. As can be seen from Table 1,72% 
of all voucher points were placed with the IPFs, an outcome that signalled the desire of 
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the population to diversify risk in a situation of limited and distorted information? There 
was a significant concentration of points among the IPFs, with the 13 largest IPFs having 
received 56% of all points remitted to the IPFs. 
The process of converting points into shares took place in rounds of bidding. In 
addition to published background data on all firms, in each round the individuals and 
IPFs knew the administratively set price of a share in each enterprise (denominated in 
voucher points) and they submitted written bids, using their points. In the first round, 
which started on May 18 and ended on June 8,1992, the starting price was set uniformly 
and arbitrarily at 3 shares of each firm for 100 points. At the start the total value of 
shares (in points) thus exceeded the total number of points. 
As can be seen from Table 1, within each round most firms ended up in a situation 
of either excess supply or excess demand. In those cases where the supply of shares 
exceeded the demand for shares by individuals and IPFs, the government exchanged 
shares for points and adjusted the price per share downwards for the next round. In those 
cases where demand exceeded supply by lcss than 25% and a sufficient part of the 
demand was represented by the IPFs, all shares were exchanged for points according to 
the following procedure: the shares were fmt used to satisfy completely the bids of 
individual voucher holders and the remainder was then rationed to the bidding IPFs. The 
rationing of the IPFs was proportional to the size of their bid and each IPF had to receive 
at least 80% of its bid. In cases where demand for shares exceeded supply by more than 
25% or where IPFs would have been rationed below 80% of their bids, the points were 
returned (no transaction took place) and the price of shares was raised by the government 
for the next round of bidding. 
The adjustment of share prices between individual rounds reflected the dilemma faced 
by high-level government officials who hoped to adjust share prices so as to achieve 
rapid convergence between demand and supply. An important assumption underlying their 
thinking about the optimal price adjustment between rounds was that the overall demand 
for the shares of a given enterprise could be characterized as having a unitary elasticity - 
with an increase (decrease) in a share price between rounds leading to an equi- 
proportionate decrease (increase) in the demand for shares in the next round. This 
assumption translated into the working hypothesis that one could induce equilibrium 
between rounds by adjusting prices proportionately to excess demand, since the overall 
allocation of points (bids) across firms by individuals and IPFs would remain unchanged. 
In conceptualizing the process, the top decision-makers thus usually talked about the price 
with which they could equate demand and supply after each round, once the extent of 
excess demand for the shares of each firm became known. The officials also increased 
uncertainty by leaving undetermined the number of rounds and according themselves 
discretionary powers to alter share prices, remove excess demand firms out of the 
privatization process and suddenly terminate the first wave. 
In practice, the officials relied heavily on their own intuition and discretion. For the 
second round, for instance, no excess demand f m s  were taken out of the process. Prices 
were adjusted according to a simple, linearized, ad hoc scheme which included a price 
floor (10 shares for 100 points) and a price ceiling (1 share for 400 points). Similarly, 
for the third round the officials used discretion within a simplified censored scheme that 
took into account the extent of disequilibria in both the fmt  and second round. In this 
adjustment process the officials reduced drastically to 97 sharesper 100 points the share 
prices of f m s  that were in a severe and continuous excess supply. Interestingly, despite 
dramatic shifts of most firms between excess demand and supply, the officials continued 
to use the concept of unitary elasticity of demand as a working hypothesis throughout the 
first wave (see, e.g., Krcmar, 1992). 
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Between May and December 1992 the voucher privatization process went through five 
rounds. After the fourth round the government announced that the fifth round would be 
the final one and used brute force to terminate the process. In h e  with its hypothesis of 
unitary elasticity and limited switching of demand across fm, the government exhorted 
investors who ended up in excess demand in round four to keep their bids in the same 
companies in round five. The government announced that it would adjust prices so that 
all  investors in these companies would be assured of receiving shares. In contrast, 
investors allocating vouchers to companies that ended round four in excess supply were 
told they would receive shares only if these companies avoided excess demand in round 
five. In Table 1, we present some of the most important summary statistics related to the 
privatization process. 
2.2 The basic characteristics of the outcome 
As can be seen from Table 1, the percentage of shares sold in the fust five rounds was 
302, 25.9%, 10.8%, 12.4%, and 13.7%, respectively. The authorities hence succeeded 
in selling 56% of all shares in the first two rounds alone. This was a remarkable 
achievement but the drastic adjustment of prices between rounds 2 and 3 resulted in few 
sales in the third round, as many large firms suddenly ended up in a situation of excess 
demand. Transactions picked up afterwards and after the fdth (terminal) round this 
number rose to 92.8% of all shares being sold. 
With 7.2% of shares remaining unallocated after the terminal (fifth) round, the system 
hence stopped short of complete convergence. The lack of complete convergence was 
further accentuated by the fact that the number of firms whose shares sold completely 
( ie . ,  firms that experienced less than 25% excess demand and had sufficient presence of 
IPFs) was only 48 in the first round, 72 in the second round, 51 in the third round, 79 
in the fourth round, and 40 in the fifth round. Hence, with 92.8% of shares transacted 
after the fifth round, the scheme succeeded in selling completely less than 2Wo of firms. 
The number of firms that ended each round in e x c w  demand was also high: 469 in the 
first round, 513 in the second round, 508 in the third round, 369 in the fourth round, and 
157 in the fifth round. 
Yet, from the practical policy standpoint the extent of convergeno was remarkable. 
Not only were almost 93% of all shares sold, but only 3.5% of individuals’ and 0.3% of 
IPFs’ vouchers remained unallocated after the fifth round. The success of the scheme was 
also underscored by the fact that participation of citizens and IPFs in each round was 
massive, covering 92% of all voucher holders in the first round, 88% in the second 
round, 93% in the third round, 88.5% in the fourth round, and 90.3% in the fifth round. 
When broken down according to individuals vs. IPFs (Table l), the participation by 
the IPFs is found to have been significantly higher than that of individuals. Measured in 
terms of the percentage of demand converted into shares, one observes that individuals 
succeeded in converting 32%, 48.9%, 8.5%, 37.5%, and 83.3% of their bids into shares 
in the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth round respectively; IPFs succeeded in 
converting 40%, 54.796, 16%, 31.9%, and 90.5% in these rounds, respectively. The IPFs 
hence rushed and converted a larger fraction of their points into shares in the early 
rounds than did individuals. In four out of the five rounds the IPFs also succeeded in 
realizing a larger proportion of their demand than the individuals, thus presumably buying 
more proportionately into excess supply firms. The individual investors thus appear to 
have been less risk averse than the funds and, since prices declined on average after the 
second round and dramatically 50 after the third round (see Table l), the more patient 
individuals benefited. 
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In the n s t  of the paper we analyse this process of large-scale change in ownership 
in greater detail. 
3. The data used for empirical work 
The data set used in our empirical investigation comes from the Center for Voucher 
Privatization of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Finance. It contains offcial information 
about each firm that was publicly available to the citizens and IPFs. The data, the 
summary statistics of which are provided in Appendix Table Al, provide financial and 
production information about each enterprise, the starting and evolving information about 
the share prices of each firm’during the five rounds of bidding, the value of bids 
(demand) and actual transactions made by the individual voucher holders as a group and 
IPFs as a group with respect to each f m  in each round. 
All the data are available separately for the Czech and Slovak Republics. While 
individual citizens and IPFs were not constrained geographically in placing their bids, the 
expected partition of Czechoslovakia and the potentially different future performance of 
firms in the two republics may have brought about asymmetric demand for shares. The 
data set permits us to carry out our analysis separately for the Czech and Slovak 
republics and test this hypothesis. We are also able to test whether the government 
authorities used the same rule for adjusting prices in the two Republics. 
4. The empirical framework 
An empirical investigation of the determinants of the bidding (demand) behaviour of 
individual investors and IPFs, as well as the price-setting behaviour of the authorities, is 
complicated by the lack of a well-established theoretical framework in this area. The 
problem with applying standard theory stems from the fact that the scheme was highly 
unusual, the behaviour of all agents was very strategic, and the authorities intentionally 
raised uncertainty about the rules of the game and their own future moves. The 
authorities at times also acted highly unpredictably (e.g., in setting prices for round 3) 
and towards the end of the process the behaviour of all agents was in many respects 
affected b y  the imminent partition of Czechoslovakia. 
In the absence of a tight theoretical framework, our goal in this paper is to generate 
stylized facts about the main behavioural patterns during the privatization rounds and thus 
provide a base for future theoretical modelling and policy work. Our empirical 
specifications are hence loosely guided by standard price theory concepts, game theory 
notions of strategic interaction and institutional features. The specifications are 
intentionally flexible so as to peraxit the data to show up systematic behavioural features. 
The empirical model consists of a set of quantity and price regressions. The quantity 
regressions relate the individual investors’ and the IPFs’ demand for shares in each firm 
to a set of firm- and industry-specific background variables which are invariant over the 
rounds of bidding and a set of variables whose values vary across f m s  and over the 
rounds. The regressors are the principal variables that one would expect to influence 
demand for shares under traditional demand theory as well as in most game theory 
frameworks, given the available information and the institutional framework. Most 
regressors are time-invariant, capturing the background situation of each enterprise. These 
regressors cover financial, sectoral and structural aspects of the firm’s performance. The 
values of three variables - the supply (availability) of shares of each enterprise for the 
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upcoming round, the sham price set by the authorities for the upcoming round and the 
ratio of demandhpply (k, excess demand) for shares in the previous round - change 
over time during the rounds. The lagged excess demand was naturally excluded from the 
first round regressions, as was the share price variable, since all prices were identical at 
the start. Unless otherwise noted, all price and value regressors take on 1991 values. 
The bidding behaviour of P F s  and individuals may be expected to differ for a 
number of reasons. First, because of their size and expertise, the IPFs are likely to have 
invested much more heavily into information gathering about firms than individual 
investors. Uniike individual investors, the P F s  could also hope to assemble sufficiently 
large packages of shares in specific firms to intluence the behaviour of management. For 
these reasons the IPFs may be expected to concentrate their bids on specific firms and 
be willing to place these bids at a higher price than individuals. The prediction on the 
speed with which individuals vs. IPFs will try to convert points into shares is unclear. 
Individuals may be expected to be more risk averse and hence rush more with the 
conversion of points into shares. The IPFs on the other hand had to convert large 
numbers of points and they were rationed in cases of mild excess demand. Finally, 
because of their size, the IPFs could be expected to bid for shares of firms where a large 
number of shares was still available. For these and other reasons, we ran the quantity 
regressions separately for the demand (bids) of individuals and IPFs and we tested the 
relevant cross-equation restrictions. 
Since observed demand is non-negative, the dependent variable is censored on the left. 
We therefore used the one limit Tobit method for estimating parameters of the demand 
equations. The residuals displayed heteroscedasticity and the regressions were hence 
adjusted for heteroscedasticity, using the logarithm of the squared deviations from the 
mean of the supply of shares, share price and the ratio of share demand to share supply 
as regressors in the heteroscedasticity adjustment process. Separate runs were carried out 
and cross equation restrictions were tested for the demand of individuals and IPFs across 
the two Republics as well as for the stability of coefficients across rounds. 
The price regressions relate the share prices set by the authorities for the next round 
to a set of variables that were used by the authorities to determine the price adjustment. 
As we indicated in Section 2, the Czechoslovak authorities imposed well-defined limits 
on the minimum and maximum prices in each round and these limits were also clearly 
identifiable in the raw data. As a result, in estimating the price equations we used a two 
limit Tobit. with an adjustment for heteroscedasticity. The regressors used in the 
heteroscedasticity adjustment were the logarithm of the squared deviations from the mean 
of the supply of shares and the ratio of share demand to share supply. 
In order to ensure stability of the heteroscedasticity-Tobit estimator, all estimations 
were carried out using an iterative maximum likelihood rather than a generalized least 
squares method in cases where no censoring occurred. In the censored cases, the 
maximum likelihood method was used. The computations were carried out using the 
LIMDEP package and several stahing values were used for each estimation in order to 
check that the maximum is a global one. 
Since there is no standard way to calculate R2 or other goodness of fit measures in 
the Tobit framework, in the regression results reported in this paper we calculate quasi- 
R's as follows. Within the OLS framework the standard F-test of all coefficients except 
the intercept being zero can be written in terms of R2 as: 
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R a /  (k-1)  F =  
(1-R’) / ( N - k )  ’ 
where N is the number of observations and k the 
rearranging, 
number of parameters. Upon 
(1) 
Now the Wald statistic W is asymptotically distributed as and Fk-l, N-l has an 
asymptotic distribution as [xf-~(~-l)]/~i-r/(N-~)I.  Since Xi-d(N-k) goes 
asymptotically to unity as N grows, it follows that: 
Combining equations (1) and (2) permits us to express an asymptotic (quari) R2 as R2: 
Intuitively, our R2 corresponds to the standard RZ from an OLS equation with the same 
N and k, and achieving the same Wald statistic as we do in our regressions. 
5. The empirical results 
5.1 Demand for shares equations 
The estimated parameters of the demand for shares equations for the first four rounds of 
bidding are reported in Tables 2-5, respectively, while the results for the fifth round are 
contained iri Tables 6 and 7. The tables contain separate parameter estimates of the 
individuals’ and IPFs’ demand for shares of firms in each of the two republics. 
5.1.1 Round 1 
As can be seen from Table 2, with share prices being set arbitrarily at the same level for 
all firms, financial indicators guided the demand for shares in the first round. Both 
individuals and IPFs displayed very high and positive demand elasticities with respect to 
the profitability (profithhare) of firms in both republics. A similarly rational finding is 
the significant negative elasticity of demand for shares with respect to the firm’s total 
debvassets ratio, found in all four regressions. While long-term debt reflected the 
inherited burden from the previous regime, short-term debt in part proxies for the 
willingness of the financial institutions to lend to the firm. The short-term debt variable 
in fact displayed positive coefficients in the first round, with three out of four being 
statistically significant. 
The remaining variables displayed less uniform patterns. The size of the firm, proxied 
by a cubic function of assets, was valued by individual investors but disliked by the IPFs. 
The extent to which a part of the enterprise’s shares was being sold to a foreign (western) 
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company was Seen as a positive signal by individuals and funds with respect to the &ech 
enterprises. The coefficients were insigniricant with respect to Slovak firms, but this was 
in large part given by the lack of foreign capital in Slovakia. The percentage of shares 
being sold to a private Czechoslovak individual or group had a positive effect on the 
PFs' demand for shares of the Czech firms but a negative effect on the demand of 
individuals. The variable had insignificant effects on the demand for shares of the Slovak 
h s .  The change in profits between 1990 and 1991, reflecting the change in enterprise 
profitability as the country moved from the period of price controls and subsidies to the 
new era of free prices and limited or no subsidies, had a positive effect on the demand 
for shares in the Czech Republic and a negative one in Slovakia. The availability (supply) 
of shares, proxying the probability with which one would succeed in converting points 
into shares rather than ending up in excess demand, had a strong positive effect on 
demand for Czech shares by both individuals and funds. In the case of Slovak firms, the 
coefficient was insignificant for individuals and significantly negative for funds. Since 
many large Slovak firms allocated 97% of shares into the voucher scheme, it is possible 
that the negative coefficient on the number of shares variable reflected the poor quality 
of some of the large Slovak firms that were included in the voucher scheme. Nonetheless, 
in comparing the regressions for the Czech and Slovak enterprises it appears that the 
behaviow of investors vis-d-vis the Slovak firms was not guided as much by traditional 
economic criteria as it was vis-d-vb the Czech firms. 
The coefficients on the sectoral dummies in Table 2 indicate that, while the funds and 
individuals displayed some preference for firms in light industry and services, these 
sectoral preferences were not very strong, ceteris paribus. Similarly, coefficients on a 
variable measuring the distance of the company from the German or Austrian border and 
a dummy variable for Prague, which we included in other specifications, were generally 
insignificant or lacked a clear-cut pattern. 
5.1.2 Round 2 
In the second round the investors faced adjusted p r i m  and had information about the 
extent of excess demand or supply for the shares of individual companies in round 1. The 
question that naturally arises is whether these variables had a significant effect on 
demand in round 2. As can be seen from Table 3, in round 2 the elasticity of demand 
with respect to own share price was negative in all four regressions, but only in the case 
of individuals' demand for the shares of Czech companies was it statistically significant.6 
Similarly, the extent of excess demand (demand/supply) in the previous round did not 
seem to divert investors' demand to other companies. In fact, this "lethargy" seems to 
have been precisely the impetus for the "overreaction" of the authorities in adjusting 
prices for round 3. 
The adjustment of prices and the information about excess demand did, however, 
reduce the importance of the background financial variables. The profit/share and short- 
term debt coefficients in Table 3 remain positive, but are statistically significant only in 
the case of the IPFs. Moreover, the total indebtedness variable retained its significantly 
negative coefficient only in the case of IPFs' demand for Czech enterprise shares. 
Starting with round 2, both the IPFs and individuals shifted their demand toward 
larger firms (as measured by assets), ceteris paribus. Pre-purchase of a part of the firm 
by foreign or domestic investors stopped influencing demand, while the change in 
profitability between 1990 and 1991 had a uniformly positive effect. With the exception 
of the IF'F demand for Slovak enterprises, the supply of shares started to have a strong 
positive effect on demand. Sectoral preferences were limited and tended toward the light 
industry in the Czech Republic. 
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5.1.3 Round 3 
The authorities adjusted prices dramatically between the second and third round and the 
own price elasticities of demand became significantly negative in the third round, as 
expected, with respect to the Czech firms (Table 4). In Slovakia, the price elasticities 
were also negative but statistically insignificant. The effect of the demandhupply ratio 
in round 2 on demand in round 3 was negative and statistically significant in all four 
regressions. Both the IPFs and individuals hence started shifting from excessively 
oversubscribed companies to those characterized by a lower demandhpply ratio. 
With more than 55% of all shares having been sold and the number of remaining 
rounds being uncertain after the second round, individual as well as institutional investors 
clearly became concerned about their ability to convert points into sharcs. The availability 
(supply) of shares became an important determinant of demand of the IPFs and 
individuals in the third round, with the estimated elasticities on the supply of shares 
variable being positive and significant in all four regressions in Table 4. 
In contrast, with the exception of firm size (proxied by total assets) and possibly 
short-term debt, the background indicators ceased having a systematic impact on demand. 
5.1.4 Round 4 
By the time investors placed their bids for shares in the fourth round, a number of 
developments made a rapid conversion of points into shares an important goal for many 
individuals and IPFs. First, the split of Czechoslovakia into two separate republics 
became a certainty and the need for the authorities to terminate the first wave of the 
voucher process became evidently pressing. Second, the authorities explicitly started 
exhorting investors to keep their bids unchanged rather than switch away from excess 
demand firms, implying that the adjustment of prices would be such that excess demand 
would be eliminated and transactions would take place. Third, over two-thirds of all 
shares earmarked for voucher privatization had been sold.' 
As can be seen from Table 5,  the share supply variable registered a highly significant 
and large positive coefficient, reflecting the desire of the remaining investors to succeed 
in converting their points into shares. At the same time, the exhortation of the authorities 
not to shy away from fms in excess demand made the coefficient on the lagged 
demandhupply variable turn strongly positive and highly significant. The estimated price 
elasticity remained negative in three of the four regressions, but only in the case of 
individuals' demand for shares in Czech firms was the coeftlcient statistically significant 
and negative. Investors hence started to be guided less by price considerations and more 
by the probability of obtaining shares. The time invariant background variables displayed 
no systematic pattern. 
The results from the first four rounds hence show quite a rational evolution in the 
determinants of the demand for shares. With prices uniformly set and the pattern of 
demand unknown, the background financial variables were used as the best criteria for 
bidding in the first round. However, as prices were adjusted to equilibrate demand and 
supply and general bidding patterns became known, the time varying price, 
dernandhpply and share supply variables assumed importance over the fixed background 
variables. Finally, as uncertainty over obtaining shares increased and the authorities 
exhorted investors not to switch away from excess demand firms, the price variable itself 
became less important. 
5.1.5 Round 5 
After the fourth round, the authorities announced that the fifth round would be the 
terminal one and they explicitly exhorted investors to place their bids in the same 
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companies as in round 4. The officials indicated that they would adjust prices before the 
last round so as to eliminate excess demand from round 4 and ensure transactions. 
In order to check the effect of these announcements, we estimated round 5 regressions 
separately for companies that ended round 4 in excess supply (Table 6) and those that 
were in excess demand (Table 7). Lagrange multiplier tests also indicated that coefficient 
estimates were significantly different across these two sets of equations. 
As can be seen from Table 6, the excess supply companies experienced a similar 
demznd pattern for their shares in round 5 as was observed for all firms in round 4. The 
coefficient on the supply of shares variable is very large and highly significant. The 
coefficient on the lagged demand/supply variable is also positive and significant in three 
out of the four regressions. The share price and, with the exception of short-term debt, 
the background variables did not display systematic patterns. 
The round 5 regressions for companies that ended up round 4 in excess demand are 
particularly revealing. In order to test if government jawboning and price adjustment 
based on its unitary elasticity of demand hypothesis had a significant effect, we included 
the own demand from round 4, adjusted for the relative price change between rounds 4 
and 5, as an explanatory variable in these regressions. As can be seen from Table 7, this 
variable is highly significant and registers demand elasticity very close to unity in all four 
regressions. The estimated coefficients of the other explanatory variables display no 
systematic pattern. The individuals and IPFs thus appear to have heeded the instructions 
issued by the authorities in that their aggregate demand from round 4, adjusted for the 
official price change, explains almost perfectly their aggregate demand in round 5. 
5.2 Tests of moss-equation restrictions 
In order to assess whether the estimated parameters of the various demand equations 
differ between individuals and IPFs within and across the two republics as well as 
individuals and IPFs over the various rounds, we camed out a battery of Lagrange 
multiplier tests. With one sole exception we reject at 1% significance level the hypothesis 
that regression parameters are equal between individuals and IPFs both within and across 
republics. Moreover, the tests always rejected the hypothesis of coefficient stability across 
rounds. The one exception was the difference between IPFs’ demand for shares of excess 
supply Czech and Slovak companies in round 5. In this case one cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the coefficients in these two regressions are identical at all conventional 
significance test levels? 
5.3 Dynamic specifications of demand 
The estimates of the determinants of the demand for shares, reported in Tables 2-7, have 
come from essentially static specifications. Since the results indicate that the time 
invariant background variables became gradually less important than the time varying 
variables, the question naturally arises as to whether the behaviour of individual investors 
and IPFs displayed systematic dynamic effects. In order to explore this hypothesis, we 
estimated a set of linear demand equations with lagged dependent and independent 
variables for rounds 2-5.9 In the case of round 2, where only one lag is possible, we also 
included the usual background variables in the regression. The results of these 
regressions, which may be obtained from the authors upon request, indicate that the 
lagged variables are by and large significant and they diminish the importance of the 
background variables in comparison with the static model. In accordance with 
expectations, in most cases the coefficients on current price displayed negative values. 
The time varying variables hence display dynamic behaviour and the regressions also 
show a significant degree of persistence in the dependent variable. In addition, we 
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allowed for cross effects from lagged demand of IPFs to individuals' current demand and 
vice versa. This effect was often significant, thus indicating that individual investors and 
IPFs wen influenced by one anothers' past demand. 
5.4 Price adjustment equations ~ 
The price-setting behaviour of the authorities between individual rounds of bidding 
represented the centralized part of the privatization procedure. Since the originally 
contemplated complex scheme of price adjustment was greatly simplified when prices 
actually had to be adjusted between rounds, we used a simple yet flexible specification 
to approximate the price-setting process. The specification is loglinear and makes the 
price set for the next round a function of the (remaining) supply of shares and a third 
order polynomial in the optimal price that would equilibrate the supply and demand for 
shares under the assumption of unitary price elasticity of demand. This optimal price is 
given by the price in the preceding round, multiplied by the ratio of demand to supply 
from the preceding round. For price adjustments in the second and higher rounds, we also 
included the share price from the preceding round as an explanatory variable. The 
estimation method is a two-sided censored data Tobit with heteroscedasticity. The 
explanatory variables used in the heteroscedasticity adjustment are the mean square 
deviation of the supply of shares and the ratio of demand to supply of shares. 
The specification turned out to fit the data very precisely. The ordinary least squares 
estimates that were used as a starting point for the Tobit regressions produced RZs well 
in excess of 90% in all  runs and the Rzs reported in Table 8 are in most cases in the 
0.98-0.99 range. 
The estimated coefficients in Table 8 are all highly significant and have the expected 
signs. The coefficient on the price in the previous round is positive and less than unity 
in all cases except for the round 5 price adjustment for f m s  in excess demand. As 
expected, in virtually all the cases one hence observes a degree of persistence in the 
price-setting process. The coefficients on the supply of (the number of remaining) shares 
have negative signs and after the first round they are statistically significant. The "optimal 
price", given by lagged excess demand weighted by lagged price is positive and highly 
significant in all rounds, thus suggesting that the authorities' concept of unitary elasticity 
of demand was persistently being applied in adjusting prices across the rounds. The 
polynomial specification of this variable yields a positive and convex effect on price in 
both republics after round 1 and in the Czech Republic also after round 3; it yields a 
positive and concave effect in both republics after round 2 and for excess demand f m s  
also after round 4. The relationship is essentially linear after the third round in Slovakia 
and also for excess supply firms after round 4 in both republics. 
Using the likelihood values from the Czech and Slovak regressions reported in Table 
8, we carried out likelihood ratio tests of the hypothesis that the price adjustment 
processes were identical for the Czech and Slovak firms. Although the price adjustment 
process was supposed to be identical in the two republics, we found that we could reject 
the hypothesis of equality of the price adjustment coefficients at 1% significance test 
level for round 1-2 and 3-4, as well as round 4-5 in the case of excess demand firms. 
Between rounds 2 and 3 the hypothesis of coefficient equality could not be rejected at 
the 5% significance test level and in the case of excess supply firms in round 4-5 the 
hypothesis could not be rejected at the 1% level. Our results hence suggest that the 
authorities frequently applied different criteria for adjusting enterprise share prices in the 
two republics. 
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6. Conclusions 
The ability to privatize a large part of an economy in a single wave of voucher 
privatization is unprecedented in history and its feasibility has always been disputed. The 
Czechoslovak government, totally inexperienced in privatization and market transactions 
in general, has proved that this task can be done. 
An assessment of the scheme and its implementation naturally depends on the 
evaluation criteria one selects. If the principal goal of a voucher scheme is to sell quickly 
an overwhelming majority of shares to massively participating individuals and funds, the 
Czechoslovak scheme must clearly be deemed a success. It sold almost 93% of all shares 
in five rounds of bidding and,the participation of citizens and institutions in the bidding 
process was massive, resulting in fewer than 2% of voucher points not being converted 
into shares. In contrast, if complete convergence to a market clearing outcome, with most 
firms selling all shares, is the objective, the scheme is a failure. Less than 20% of the 
participating firms sold all their shares after the five rounds and the authorities had to 
resort to exhortation and finally brute force to terminate the process in round 5.  
From the standpoint of public policy, the former criterion is clearly the more 
important one and the Czechoslovak example, however inelegant, demonstrates that 
transferring state ownership of a large number of firms to citizens at large is feasible. The 
important question that immediately arises is whether the massive transfer of proprty 
rights will rapidly engender a superior economic performance in these firms. At present, 
it is too early even to make conjectures on this point. 
Our analysis of the patterns of demand for the shares of the 1,491 firms reveals quite 
rational behaviour on the part of the millions of individuals and the 434 investment 
privatization (mutual) funds. First, faced with extreme uncertainty, individual investors 
voluntarily placed 72% of their voucher points into the (partially diversified) investment 
privatization funds. Second, when share prices were set at the same level for all firms in 
the first round of bidding, individual as well as institutional investors used background 
financial information about enterprises as a guide for placing their bids. Finally, as the 
authorities adjusted prices in response to the extent of excess demand, patterns of demand 
became apparent and the supply of shares shrank over time, these time varying indicators 
replaced the fixed background indicators as the principal determinants of demand. 
The funds turned out to have a lower option value of waiting than individual investors 
and they converted a larger share of points into shares at higher prices in the earlier 
rounds. Contrary to the conjectures of some observers, one could detect only weak 
sectoral preference in demand, ceterisparibus. The dynamic specifications of the demand 
equations confirm that lagged variables played a significant part aild that the supply 
(availability) of shares, share prices and lagged demand were the principal factors 
determining demand in a given round. 
While the government officials prepared an elaborate scheme for adjusting share 
prices between rounds, in practice they relied heavily on simple rules and ad hoc 
approximations. Their public statements as well as our discussions with them revealed 
that they assumed that the investors’ demand for shares of a given enterprise had 
approximately unitary price elasticity. This behavioural assumption was reflected in the 
enormous adjustment of prices after the second round, a step which underestimated the 
response of investors and resulted in an excess demand situation for many fms .  
Incorporating this behavioural feature permitted us to capture very precisely the official 
price-setting process with a simple equation. Finally, our tests indicate that the price- 
setting behaviour was not identical across the two republics and that it varied over the 
individual rounds of bidding. 
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Endnotes 
1. For earlier discussions of various aspects of the scheme see Kyn (1992), Mejstrik and 
Burger (1992), Aggarwal and Mejstrik (1992), Krcmar (1992), and Kotrba and 
Svejnar (1994). For a broader discussion of privatization in Central and East Europe 
see Frydman and Rapaczynski (1993). 
2. By June 1992 the government, for instance, auctioned off about 27,000 units and 
returned a similar number to previous owners through a process of property 
restitution. The Czechoslovak government also estimated that by mid-1992 it had 
auctioned off about two-thirds of all the units that were scheduled to be privatized 
within the small-scale privatization process. By June 1992 the proceeds from the 
small-scale privatization amounted to about 35 billion crowns (about $1.2 billion). In 
comparison, the amount of foreign investment for 1991 was about $650 million. The 
details of this scheme may be found, for instance, in Kotrba and Svejnar (1994). 
3. Enterprises that were privatized entirely through the voucher method allocated 97% 
of their shares for vouchers. Three per cent of shares were kept by the government 
for potential restitution claims. 
4. This amount greatly exceeds the $1.6 billion in total foreign direct investment that 
entered Czechoslovakia between 1989 and 1992. Needless to say, however, the book 
(accounting) value of assets may differ dramatically from the market valuation. 
Oldrich Kyn's (1992) detailed calculations, for instance, estimate the expected market 
value of a voucher book at 14,000 crowns only. 
5. It is also worth noting that citizens of the Czech Republic placed over 99% of their 
points into Czech IPFs, while citizens of the Slovak Republic placed slightly less than 
90% in Slovak IPFs. The nationality of the fund refers to the republic in which it is 
registered and not necessarily the republic in which it invests its voucher points. 
6. This finding is consistent with the popular hypothesis that the IPFs were interested 
in obtaining shares in particular companies "at any cost". 
7. It should be noted that the composition of the bidding individuals and IPFs also 
changed dramatically, with the remaining players being less risk averse than the 
earlier group. 
8. The results of all these tests may be obtained from the authors upon request. 
9. See, e.g.,-Hendry and Mizon (1978) and Estrin and Svejnar (1992). 
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Table 1. Basic data on the first wave of Czechoslovak privatization 













No. of state enterprise3 - eligible for privatization - entering the first wave - entering the voucher scheme in the 
first wave 
Book value of sham allocated for 
voucher in wave 1 (billion mwns) 
wave 1 (= no. of points x 1.ooO) 
(Zn) Average accounting value of assets 
prr participating citizen (crowns) 
Millions of cs citizens participating in 
No. of investment privatization funds 
(IPFS) 
% of voucher points with IPFs 
k h  citizens' allocation of points with 
IPFs 
Slovak citizens' allocation of points with 
IPFs 
% of voucher scheme sham sold in 
wave 1 
- round1 
- round2 - round3 
- round4 
- round5 














% of available points used in bidding 
- roundl 
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CzsehRepubuc sbr.lrRepabuc Total 
13. % of available points used in bidding by 
illdividuala - round1 - round2 - round3 - round4 - round5 
14. % of available points uscd in bidding by 
IPFs 
- round1 - round2 
- round3 
- round 4 
- round5 
15. % of shara requested by individuals that 
were allocated - m u d l  - round2 
- round3 - m n d 4  - m d 5  
16. % of sharw requested by IPFs that were 
allocated 
- round1 - round2 - round3 - round4 - rounds 
17. Avenge Share price h points: 
- round 1 - round2 - round3 - round4 
- r m d 5  
18. No. of fvms that sold all shares 
- round1 - round2 - round3 
- m d 4  
- round5 
19. No. of fimu in excess demand - round1 
- round2 
- round 4 
- round5 
- round3 
20. No. of firms in excess supply - muodl 
- round 2 

























































































































*Government estimate Source: Czechoslovak Federal Ministry of F m c e .  
Svejnar and Singer 59 
Table 2. Demand for shares in the first round - censored data Tobit 
model with heteroscedasticity 
(coeEcients are elasticities evaluated at variable means; values in parentheses are 
standard errors) 
Czech cnterpriscs Slovak eoterprku 







% foreign ownership 
% Czechoslovak 
ownership 
A Profit (1991-1990) 






















































































































































= Stat ist idy s ip i f i i t  at 10% test level. *'=Statistically significant at 5% test level. 
60 Using vouchcrs to privatize an economy 
Table 3. Demand for shares in the second round - censored data 
Tobit model with heteroscedasticity 








% foreign ownership 
96 Czechoslovak 
omenhip 
A Profit 1991-90 
































































































































= Statistically signifcant at 10% test level. **=Statistically signiticrnt at 5% test level. 
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Table 4. Demand for shares in the third round - censored data Tobit 
model with heteroscedasticity (coefficients are elasticities evaluated at variable 
means; values in parentheses are standard errors) 
Czech enterprlra Slovak enterprisu 






% foreign ownenhip 
96 czechoslovak 
ownership 




































































































































































~ ~~ ~~ 
* = Statistially significant at 10% test level. **=Statistidly significant at 5% test level. 
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Table 5. Demand for shares in the fourth round - censored data Tobit 
model with heteroscedasticity 






96 foreign ownership 
% Crechoslovak 
ownenhip 












Czcch cntcrprbrs Slovak entcrprLPa 
Fun& Individuals Funds Indhiduab 

























































































































































= Statistically significant at 10% test level. **=Statistically significant at 5% test level. 
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Table 6. Demand for shares in the fifth round - (demand,, < supply, 
censored Tobit with heteroscedasticity 







% foreign ownership 
% Czechoslovak 
ownership 













Czech enterprises Slovak enterprises 
Fun& Individuals Fun& fadividuah 

























































































































































= Statistically significant at 10% test level. **=!3tatisticllly significPnt at 5% test level. 
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Table 7. Demand for shares in the fifth round - (deman4, > supply, 
(coefficients are elasticities evaluated at variable means; values ii parentheses are 
standard errors) 
censored Tobit with heteroscedasticity 
Ctrch enterprisu ’ Slovak entecpdw 
Funds Indhiduals Funds Individuals 










A Profit 1991-1990 
Share supply 
Share price 










































































































































































= Statistically significant at 10% test level. **=Statistically signiaant at 5% test level. 
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Table 8. Price adjustment variables - censored data Tobit model with 
heteroscedasticity 
(dependent variable = Qnp,; values in parentheses are standard errors) 
436 4.14.. 
(0.92) (0.83) 
(SUPPlY) I -0.004 -0.002 
(0.008) ( O . O w )  
In @em.ad/arpply)., . 1.07.. 0.94.. 
p.1 (0.012) (0.014) 
[In @crmadlarp~ly)~,]'. 0.19.. 0.16.. 
Pel (0.008) (0.095) 
[tn @emmd/supply),.,]'. 0.011*%.01** 
P.l (0.001) (0.002) 
N 9 5 8 4 8 5  

















( 0 . W  (0.007) 












(0.08) (0.5) (0.m 
0.15*7).03 0.61.. 
(0.02)(0.03) (0.01) 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) 






239 130 579 















= Statistidy signikant at 10% test kvcl. 
** st.tistidy signiticlmr It 5% t u t  Icvcl. 
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Appendix A 
Table Al. Summary statistics of the main variables 
V h b k  Mean . StPndarddcvIrtlon Minfmum Maximum 
Czrchodor.ki. round 1 
ROfit/hR? 
% Totpl deWDsscts 
Short-term debt 
Total asscts 
% Foreign ownership 
% Cztcboalovak ownership 
A MGt (1991-1990) 











































































Czceh round 1 
ProfiVshare 
% total debVassets 
Short-term debt 
Total assets 
% foreign ownership 
% Czechoslovak ownership 
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servicu 
IllfraStructure 
Supply of shares 
Share price 
Equilibrium price 
0.11 0.3 1 0.00 1.00 
0.037 0.19 0.00 1 .00 
2.ZE.45 6.1E+05 2172 MEW 
33.33 0.0 33.33 33.33 
0.46 1.65 0.0012 48.47 





I foreign ownership 
96 Czechoslovak ownership 











































































Czccharlovakia round 2 
Supply of shares 
Share price 
1.5E+05 3.98+05 58.0 9.28+06 
38.28 49.85 10.00 400.00 
Equilibrium price 0.40 0.96 1.1E-03 19.31 
Czech round 2 
Supply of shares 1.5E+05 3.3E+05 58.00 5.1E+06 
Share price 42.16 52.56 10.00 400.00 
Equilibrium price 0.42 0.87 l.lE-03 19.24 
Slovakia round 2 
Supply of shares 1.4E+05 4.98+05 69.00 9.2E+O6 
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V.ri.bh M a n  Stradrrddevhtloo Mintmum Mulnmm 
share price 30.61 43.06 10.00 400.00 
Equilibrium price 0.36 1.12 l.lE-03 1931 
Czechorloralda round 3 
Supply of shares 96443. 323-05 10.00 6.8EtO7 
Share price 55.98 94.79 1.03 800.00 
Equilibrium price 0.30 0.76 0.00 14.19 
~~ 
Czech round 3 
Supply of shares 
Share price 
Equilibrium price 
94476. 2.8E+O5 26.00 5.1EtO6 
60.09 98.04 1.03 800.00 
0.32 0.77 0.00 14.19 
Slovakia round 3 
Supply of shares 1.OE+05 3.8E+05 10.00 6.88+06 
Share price 48.07 87.75 1.03 800.00 
Equilibrium price 0.25 0.73 3.5E-03 13.20 
Czechoslovakia round 4 
Supply of shares 75608. 285E+05 13.0 6.75E+06 
Share price 60.97 112.02 1.67 1Ooo.o 
Equilibrium price 0.33 2.15 0.01 73.72 
Czech round 4 
Supply of shares 73545. 2.17E+05 26.00 3.39E+06 
Share price 64.58 119.04 1.666 1OOO. 
Equilibrium price 0.38 2.60 0.01 73.72 
Slovak round 4 
Supply of shares 79718. 3.85E+05 13.00 6.758+06 
Share price 53.78 96.26 1.69 800.0 
Equilibrium price 0.24 0.62 0.01 8.95 
Czechoslovakia round 4 
Supply of shares 50566. 2.548+05 7.00 6.758+06 
Share price 59.65 103.10 1.67 loo0 
Equilibrium price 0.34 1.35 0.01 29.23 
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VUi8MC Mean Staodanldev&tion Minimum Maximum 
Czecb round 5 
Supply of shares 47612. 1.838+05 7.00 3.4846 
Share price 62.43 106.20 1.67 1000 
Equilibrium price 0.37 1.60 0.01 29.23 
Slovak round 5 
Supply of shares 
Share price 
Equilibrium price 
56348. 3.54E+05 8.00 6.758+06 
54.21 96.63 1.92 800.0 
0.27 0.60 0.01 6.77 
